Embassy Developments Ltd — FY 2026 Annual Report Analysis

Annual Report Analysis (Consolidated)

Investor Snapshot

#	Analytical point	Sentiment
1	**Embassy operates as a high-beta luxury real estate player with a massive □16,300 Cr GDV pipeline, yet it remains structurally constrained by a stagnant land bank comprising 99% of its □12,350 Cr inventory.**	—
2	***Revenue contracted by 20.5% to 1,732 Cr, while net losses widened significantly to - 872 Cr, highlighting a severe disconnect between top-line accounting and operational scale.***	—
3	***Operating margins are under extreme pressure as the company's -2.0% ROCE is dwarfed by distressed borrowing costs, indicating systemic value destruction.***	—
4	***Reported profitability is further obscured by aggressive accounting, including a 500% surge in interest capitalization to 150 Cr and one-time gains from warrant valuations.***	—
5	***The capital structure has shifted toward high-risk NCDs with distressed IRRs of 18.1%–18.3%, signaling limited access to traditional low-cost banking channels.***	—
6	***Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) of just 44 Cr is critically inadequate to service annual interest obligations of 545 Cr, resulting in a precarious interest coverage ratio of 0.08x.***	—
7	**Liquidity is currently dependent on external equity infusions, evidenced by a □1,406 Cr raise and a □362 Cr promoter warrant issue used primarily for debt repayment.**	—
8	***Inventory efficiency is among the lowest in the peer group, with a turnover cycle of 2,824 days, reflecting capital locked in long-gestation land parcels rather than active construction.***	—
9	***Governance risks are elevated due to high relative-party transactions (10% of revenue) and nepotism concerns regarding high KMP compensation for family members despite heavy losses.***	—
10	***The primary risk is a debt spiral; any 12-month execution delay or a 10% softening in Mumbai luxury pricing could trigger defaults on high-cost NCDs.***	—
11	**The outlook hinges entirely on the successful conversion of the □4,631 Cr pre-sales momentum into rapid cash collections to bridge the massive funding gap.**	—
12	**Investment View: Watch; stance remains cautious until CFO/Interest coverage exceeds 1.0x and inventory turnover days reduce below 1,500.**	—

1. Business overview (In Bullet Points)

- **MMR Pivot & Luxury Concentration:** EDL has executed a strategic shift toward the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR), focusing on the ultra-luxury segment. The flagship **Embassy Citadel (Worli)** project, with a GDV of ~□8,800 Cr, represents a disproportionate share of the company's future value.
- **Asset-Light Hybridization:** The company is increasingly utilizing the **Development Management (DM)** model, such as Project Bayview in Juhu (GDV ~□3,000 Cr), earning a 10% DM fee. This reduces capital intensity but increases reliance on brand equity.
- **Revenue & Cost Drivers:** Pre-sales surged 128% to □4,631 Cr, yet the business is in a "cash-burn for growth" phase. Record pre-sales are currently offset by massive construction outflows of □1,182 Cr.

- **Inventory Overhang:** The company faces a significant inventory drag, with ₹12,433 Cr locked in inventory (primarily land), suggesting a 7-year inventory overhang based on current sales velocity.
- **Expansion Plans:** Management is aggressive on launches, with 11 projects planned for FY27 to maintain sales momentum.
- **Acquisitions:** The acquisition of **Squadron Developers** for the Worli project is the primary strategic bet, though it is being funded by high-cost debt.
- **Geographical Presence:** Transitioning from a diversified Bengaluru-centric player to a high-beta bet on Mumbai's top-tier luxury market.

2. Management commentary & outlook

- **Strategic Direction:** The rebranding from Equinox to Embassy is complete, signaling a shift from "integration and survival" in FY25 to "institutional scaling" in FY26.
- **Growth Guidance:** Management has set aggressive FY27 targets of ₹8,000 Cr in owned pre-sales and ₹2,000 Cr in DM sales, implying ~115% growth.
- **Execution Environment:** The guidance assumes a perfect macro environment for luxury real estate and zero execution delays in the complex Mumbai market.
- **Succession Planning:** The appointment of **Neel Virwani (27 years old)** as Chief Business Officer (CBO) signals a tightening of family control over professional management, with a ₹5.47 Cr compensation package.
- **Capital Strategy:** Management is utilizing preferential warrant issues to the Promoter Group (₹362.6 Cr) at a premium to regulatory floors, primarily to repay shareholder debt.
- **Managerial Remuneration:** Despite "inadequate profits" under Section 198, the company continues to pay high managerial costs, justifying them through "strategic leadership."
- **Management Tone:** The tone is **Hyper-Aggressive & Opportunistic**. Management has successfully decoupled the narrative from the "Indiabulls legacy" and is using the "Embassy" brand to justify a high-growth, high-leverage strategy. The tone is no longer survivalist; it is expansionary to the point of being "promoter-centric," evidenced by the rapid elevation of the next generation of the Virwani family into key executive roles.

3. Financial analysis

3.1 Financial statements

P&L statement (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2026	Mar 2025
Sales	1,732	2,180
Sales Growth %	-20.56	426.81
Expenses	2,205	1,887
Material Cost %	93	0
Raw material cost	1,607	0
Change in inventory	0	0
Manufacturing Cost %	0	75
Employee Cost %	15	5
Other Cost %	19	6
Operating Profit	-474	293
OPM %	-27	13
Other Income	173	210
Exceptional items	0	157
Other income normal	173	53
Interest	549	461
Depreciation	48	15
Profit before tax	-897	27
Tax %	-3	-643
Net Profit	-872	194
Profit from Associates	2	-9
Minority share	0	6
Exceptional items AT	0	100
Profit excl Excep	-873	94
Profit for PE	-873	100
Profit for EPS	-873	200
Profit Growth %	-977	124
EPS (□)	-6.28	1.63
Dividend Payout %	0	0

Balance sheet (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2026	Mar 2025
Equity Capital	278	244
Reserves	9,590	9,077
Borrowings	5,322	4,594
Long term Borrowings	3,261	2,515
Short term Borrowings	1,957	2,011
Lease Liabilities	105	68
Preference Capital	0	0
Other Borrowings	0	0
Other Liabilities	6,348	6,572
Non controlling int	96	6
Trade Payables	932	906
Advance from Customers	0	2,692
Other liability items	5,320	2,969
Total Liabilities	21,538	20,488
Fixed Assets	6,188	6,089
Land	0	0
Building	0	103
Plant Machinery	0	10
Ships Vessels	0	0
Equipments	0	1
Computers	0	3
Furniture n fittings	0	1
Vehicles	0	37
Intangible Assets	2,516	2,516
Other fixed assets	0	3,514
Gross Block	0	6,185
Accumulated Depreciation	0	95
CWIP	1	9
Investments	165	98
Other Assets	15,185	14,291
Inventories	12,433	12,058
Trade receivables	23	52
Receivables over 6m	0	35.49
Receivables under 6m	0	18.06
Prov for Doubtful	0	-1.81
Cash Equivalents	1,002	414

Line item	Mar 2026	Mar 2025
Loans n Advances	189	171
Other asset items	1,539	1,597
Total Assets	21,538	20,488

Cash flow statement (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2026	Mar 2025
Cash from Operating Activity	44	1,461
Profit from operations	-412	-44
Receivables	20	293
Inventory	169	1,449
Payables	-55	274
Loans Advances	0	1
Other WC items	314	-471
Working capital changes	448	1,546
Interest paid	8	0
Direct taxes	0	-42
Cash from Investing Activity	-79	574
Fixed assets purchased	0	-54
Fixed assets sold	0	0
Investments purchased	-107	-485
Investments sold	1	34
Interest received	26	66
Dividends received	0	0
Invest in subsidiaries	0	0
Redemp n Canc of Shares	0	457
Inter corporate deposits	0	660
Other investing items	1	-105
Cash from Financing Activity	629	-1,971
Proceeds from shares	1,406	335
Proceeds from debentures	2,845	40
Redemption of debentures	-1,429	0
Proceeds from borrowings	611	366
Repayment of borrowings	-2,239	-2,102
Interest paid fin	-545	-610
Financial liabilities	-19	0
Other financing items	0	0
Net Cash Flow	595	64
Free Cash Flow	44	1,407
CFO/OP	-9	512

Key ratios

Line item	Mar 2026	Mar 2025
Debtor Days	5	9
Inventory Days	2,824	0
Days Payable	212	0
Cash Conversion Cycle	2,617	9
Working Capital Days	1,526	935
ROCE %	-2	4

3.2 Financial analysis summary

- **Revenue** from operations declined by 20.56% to □1,732.00 Cr, primarily impacted by the "Point in Time" Revenue recognition policy which requires an Occupancy Certificate before booking sales. This decline, coupled with a surge in Expenses to □2,205.00 Cr, resulted in an Operating Profit loss of -□474.00 Cr and a negative ROCE of -2.00%.
- **Net Profit** plummeted to -□872.00 Cr from □194.00 Cr, pressured by a 19.08% increase in Finance Cost to □549.00 Cr. The P&L impact was mitigated by the aggressive capitalization of □150.01 Cr in Finance Cost into Inventory (a 500% increase YoY), which inflates the Balance Sheet while deferring cost recognition.
- **Inventory** stands at a massive □12,433.00 Cr (57.7% of Total Assets), but 99% of this (□12,350.13 Cr) is locked in "Cost of land and infrastructure" rather than active construction. This stagnation is reflected in the Cash Conversion Cycle ballooning to 2,617 days and Working Capital Days rising to 1,526 days, as the business struggles to convert land into CFO, which remained a meager □44.00 Cr.
- **Total Debt** increased to □5,322.00 Cr, with a dangerous shift toward high-cost Listed Non-Convertible Debentures (□1,405.56 Cr) and unlisted NCDs (□1,378.76 Cr) carrying internal rates of return as high as 18.10% to 18.30%. This burden is poorly covered by operations, evidenced by a negative CFO/OP ratio of -9.00, forcing reliance on Financing Activity inflows of □629.00 Cr, including □1,406.00 Cr from Proceeds from shares.
- **Net Worth** was bolstered by a □132.50 Cr gain in Capital Reserve due to the forfeiture of share warrants, a non-operating equity boost that masks the underlying cash burn and the -□6.28 EPS. While Trade Receivables decreased to □23.00 Cr following a □655.00 Cr legacy receivable write-off, the Balance Sheet remains encumbered by extensive cross-guarantees.
- The **Investment Property** portfolio of □4,497.69 Cr is currently a drag, generating only □4.96 Cr in Rental Income while incurring □14.20 Cr in Depreciation and □5.18 Cr in direct operating costs. The □692.70 Cr in Assets Held for Sale (including land from Embassy East Business Park) represents a critical need for liquidation to improve FCF, which stood at only □44.00 Cr.
- **Other Assets & Liabilities: Assets Held for Sale** rose to □692.70 Cr, while Prepayments jumped to □101.97 Cr. Other Expenses are impacted by a □5.30 Cr share-based payment expense from the new ESOS 2025 scheme. The □132.50 Cr warrant forfeiture gain in Capital Reserve is the dominant non-cash equity driver.
- **Dominant Financial Theme:** The company is navigating a high-risk transition characterized by a stagnant **□12,433 Cr** land-heavy Inventory, a shift toward unsustainable 18%+ IRR debt, and a reliance on equity infusions to offset deep operating losses and high financing costs.

3.3 Contingent liabilities & commitments

- **Tax Disputes:** Income Tax paid under protest remains at **□0.26 Cr**.

- **Doubtful Deposits:** A significant provision of □**65.00 Cr** is maintained against a doubtful security deposit, suggesting long-standing recovery issues.
- **Statutory Balances:** Provision for doubtful statutory balances stands at □**27.66 Cr**.
- **Guarantees:** Extensive cross-guarantees exist where the Parent Company guarantees the debt of multiple subsidiaries (Squadron, Tapir, Lucina, etc.), creating interconnected credit risk.
- **Capital Commitments:** The Group has significant procurement and land advances (□239.96 Cr) indicating ongoing commitments for new development rights.

3.9 Earnings quality & forensic checks

#	Check	Impact	Status	Notes detail
1	PAT vs CFO trend	Profit ↓ — earnings overstate cash	—	Note 16: □150.01 Cr interest capitalized into inventory defers P&L impact but strains cash.
2	Receivables & channel-stuffing signal	Revenue ↓ — sales velocity risk	—	Note 16: 99% of inventory is land/infrastructure, indicating slow conversion to constructed saleable units.
3	Revenue timing	Revenue ↑↓ — conservative recognition	—	Note 3.06: Revenue recognized only upon OC and possession, reducing risk of aggressive revenue booking.
4	Revenue from related parties %	Revenue ↑↓ — high RPT dependence	—	Note 22: Significant reduction in RPT share purchase advances (□385 Cr) improves balance sheet quality.
5	Inventory vs revenue growth	Profit ↓ — inventory stagnation	—	Note 16: Massive land bank concentration (□12,350 Cr) suggests long-gestation or stalled development phases.
6	Inventory valuation method change	Neutral — consistent policy	—	Auditor KAM: Focus on NRV assumptions for land banks due to market price volatility.
7	Exceptional items in operating profit	Profit ↑ — non-operating boost	—	Note 26: Gain from lapsed share warrants provides equity buffer without reflecting underlying business performance.
8	Depreciation rate vs useful life policy	Profit ↓ — asset heavy	—	Note 3.07: Investment property land is not amortized, preventing artificial profit suppression on land assets.
9	Provision reversals boosting PAT	Neutral — forensic cleanup	—	Note 22: GBP 61.85m legacy receivable write-off removes "dead" assets from the gross balance sheet.
10	Tax rate consistency	Profit ↓ — tax inefficiency	—	Note 15: Income tax paid under protest (□0.26 Cr) indicates ongoing litigation with tax authorities.
11	CWIP age and stalling projects	Profit ↓ — project delays	—	Note 16: Shift of costs from CWIP to Inventory (Land/ Infra) indicates projects are in pre-construction stages.
12	Deferred tax asset recognition adequacy	Neutral — valuation risk	—	Note 1: Reverse acquisition accounting makes YoY comparisons difficult due to structural entity changes.
13	RPT quantum and trend	Neutral — improving transparency	—	Note 27(xi): Refinancing RPT debt with external NCDs improves transparency but increases interest costs.
14	Dividend paid vs FCF adequacy	Neutral — cash conservation	—	Note 27: High-cost NCDs (18%+ IRR) and net losses necessitate total cash retention for debt servicing.
15	Aggressive Interest Capitalization	Profit ↑ — deferred expense	—	Note 16: Capitalizing 21.4% of interest costs into inventory masks the true extent of the net loss.
16	High-Yield Debt Reliance	Profit ↓ — rising cost of capital	—	Note 27: Shift from bank loans to high-cost NCDs indicates distressed borrowing conditions.
17	Investment Property Yield Mismatch	Profit ↓ — negative carry	—	Note 3.07: Investment properties are currently loss-making before indirect costs.

4. Management & governance

A. Auditor Report & Key Audit Matters * **Audit opinion type:** Unqualified. * **KAM 1: Business Combination (Reverse Acquisition):** The auditor flagged the extreme complexity of Ind AS 103 application regarding the reverse merger with NAM Estates. Management's fair valuation of identifiable assets and liabilities at the acquisition date involves significant estimation. * **KAM 2: Investment Property Valuation:** The fair value of investment properties (□4,497.69 Cr) relies on Level 3 unobservable inputs (Discounted Cash Flow). The auditor noted high risk of valuation subjectivity. * **KAM 3: Recoverability of Inventories:** With a massive □12,432.52 Cr balance, the auditor focused on Net Realizable Value (NRV) assumptions. Any slight shift in market price assumptions for the land bank could lead to material impairments. * **Emphasis of Matter:** Note 1 highlights that FY2025 figures only include two months of operations post-merger, rendering YoY comparisons structurally misleading.

B. Related Party Transactions

Party	Relationship	Nature	Amount (□ Cr)	Concern
Promoter Group	Promoter	Advance for Acquisition of Assets	125.87 Cr	***Capital lock-up in promoter-linked assets***
Promoter Group	Promoter	Corporate Guarantees (Equity Component)	39.49 Cr	***Interconnected credit risk***
Neel Virwani	Relative of MD/ Chairman	Sale of Residential Unit	2.06 Cr	***Preferential pricing risk; arm's length scrutiny***
Related Parties	Various	Unbilled Revenue	5.78 Cr	***Revenue recognition timing risk***
Promoter Group	Promoter	Settlement of Share Advance	(385.00) Cr	Deleveraging of RPT exposure (Positive)

- **RPT Risk Checks:** RPT volume (□173.20 Cr) is **393.63% of CFO**, signaling the company remains a financing vehicle for the promoter ecosystem.

C. Shareholding * **Promoters:** 43.37% (Post-Issue) * **FDI/FPI:** 22.85% * **DII:** 2.60% * **Public:** 29.48% * **Pledged Shares:** 0.00%

D. Board Composition + KMP Compensation * **Total Directors:** 8 | **Independent:** 50% | **Women Directors:** 1 (Tarana Lalwani). * **KMP Compensation:** * ***Rajesh Kaimal (CFO):*** □5.53 Cr (83% jump in fixed pay despite inadequate profits). * ***Neel Virwani (CBO):*** □5.47 Cr (Son of Chairman; appointment signals nepotism risk). * **Sachin Shah (CEO):** *4.89 Cr (25.38% YoY growth). * Analysis: Compensation is scaling aggressively despite a consolidated Operating Loss of 474 Cr**.

F. Capital Allocation & Capex

Action	FY current (□Cr)	FY prior (□Cr)	% of CFO	Signal
Interest Payments	545.00	610.00	1238.63%	—
Net Debt Change	728.00	-3,155.00	1654.54%	—
Equity Issuance	1,406.00	335.00	3195.45%	—
Acquisitions	1,853.00	0.00	4211.36%	—

CAPEX Analytical Notes: * **CFO Coverage:** N/M. CFO of □44 Cr is negligible compared to **□1,853 Cr** spent on acquisitions. * **Nature:** Growth is inorganic, focused on acquiring SPVs (Squadron) for the Mumbai market. *

Efficiency: Extremely low. Revenue fell **20.5%** YoY despite the massive asset base. * **Takeaway:** The acquisition of Squadron Developers is the primary bet for survival, but it is being funded by **18%+ IRR debt**.

H. Risks * ***High Cost of Debt:*** New NCDs at **18.10% to 18.30% IRR**. Impact: Interest consumes 31% of revenue, leading to a debt spiral. (Severity: High) * ***Inventory Lock-up:*** **₹12,433 Cr** in inventory (99% land). Impact: Severe liquidity strain if sales slow. (Severity: High) * ***Contagion Risk:*** Extensive cross-guarantees across SPVs. Impact: Default in one project triggers group-wide default. (Severity: High) * ***Nepotism:*** Appointment of Neel Virwani to SMP. Impact: Potential for non-meritocratic capital allocation. (Severity: Med)

5. Scorecard & verdict

Part a: scorecard

Dimension	Rating (1–5)	Delta	Key evidence	One-line rationale
Business quality	3	→	₹4,631 Cr Pre-sales; 99% Inventory in Land	Strong brand and sales momentum offset by extreme concentration and inventory stagnation.
Financial health	1	↓	D/E 0.3x (via dilution); CFO ₹44 Cr < Interest ₹545 Cr	Operational cash flow is insufficient to service high-cost debt; reliant on equity raises.
Earnings quality	2	↓	₹150 Cr Interest Capitalized; ₹132 Cr Warrant Gain	Profits are masked by aggressive capitalization and one-time equity windfalls.
Management & governance	2	↓	Neel Virwani (CBO) pay ₹5.47 Cr; RPT/CFO > 300%	Nepotism concerns and high RPT volume relative to cash generation.
Capital allocation & earnings visibility	2	↓	ROCE -2.0%; Debt IRR 18% +; 7-year inventory	Value-destructive borrowing costs exceed returns; visibility dependent on high-risk Mumbai luxury.

Business positives (for this company this year) * **[Sales Momentum]:** Pre-sales surged **128% to ₹4,631 Cr**, demonstrating strong market traction for the Embassy brand. * **[Deleveraging RPT]:** Settlement of **₹385 Cr** in share purchase advances to related parties improves balance sheet transparency. * **[Asset-Light Traction]:** Successful utilization of the DM model with **₹3,000 Cr GDV** at Project Bayview. * **[Equity Infusion]:** Raised **₹1,406 Cr** through equity issuance, providing a necessary liquidity buffer.

Business negatives / concerns (for this company this year) * **[Debt Spiral Risk]:** New debt issued at distressed **18.1% - 18.3% IRR**, while ROCE is negative (-2.0%). * **[Cash Flow Mismatch]: CFO of ₹44 Cr** is grossly inadequate to cover Interest Payments of ₹545 Cr. * **[Inventory Stagnation]: ₹12,350 Cr (99%)** of inventory is locked in land/infrastructure with a 2,824-day turnover cycle. * **[Aggressive Capitalization]: ₹150.01 Cr** of interest was capitalized into inventory, a 500% increase, masking the true net loss. * **[Governance/Nepotism]:** Appointment of a 27-year-old family member as CBO with a **₹5.47 Cr** package despite operating losses.

Overall scorecard summary Embassy Developments is in a precarious state where strong operational sales momentum is being completely undermined by a value-destructive capital structure. While the brand successfully drives pre-sales, the company's reliance on 18%+ IRR debt to fund a stagnant ₹12.4k Cr land bank creates a high risk of a debt spiral. Governance is weakening due to nepotism and high RPT-to-cash ratios, placing the company on a deteriorating trajectory unless Mumbai luxury collections can rapidly bridge the massive interest-coverage gap.

Part b: governance check matrix

#	Check	Status
1	Audit opinion clean?	—
2	Promoter pledge = 0?	—
3	KMP pay < 5% of PAT?	—
4	RPT quantum < 5% of revenue?	—
5	Board > 50% independent?	—
6	At least 1 woman director?	—
7	No statutory dues outstanding?	—
8	No fraud reported?	—
9	Audit trail enabled?	—
10	Frequent Auditor change	—

Total: 8/10 — Governance Rating: 3

Part c: investor verdict

Thesis: EDL is a high-beta play on Mumbai luxury real estate, currently functioning as a promoter-centric vehicle trapped in a high-interest debt cycle. **Overall stance:** Watch **Rationale:** Record pre-sales are encouraging, but the 18% debt cost and aggressive interest capitalization make the current valuation unsustainable without massive cash collections. **Re-evaluate when:** CFO/Interest Coverage ratio exceeds 1.0x (currently ~0.08x). **BULL CASE:** Successful delivery and 100% collection of the □8,800 Cr Worli project within 3 years, leading to total debt elimination. **BEAR CASE:** A 10% slowdown in Mumbai luxury pricing or a 12-month execution delay, triggering defaults on 18% IRR NCDs. **Key monitorable:** Inventory Turnover Days: 2,824 → Watch for reduction below 1,500 days.

7. Year-over-year analysis

7.1 Changes

Metric / theme	Summary a status	Summary b status	Forensic takeaway
Capital Allocation	Purging legacy value destruction via a ₹35,829 Cr "kitchen-sinking" impairment and ₹385 Cr RPT advances.	Funding inorganic SPV acquisitions (Squadron) and promoter debt repayment through distressed 18% IRR debt.	The company has transitioned from cleaning the balance sheet to aggressive, high-cost expansion that prioritizes the promoter ecosystem over sustainable minority returns.
Margin Trajectory	Reported 13% OPM but core profit was negative, masked by a ₹308 Cr investment sale and tax credits.	Operating margins collapsed to -27% with a ₹872 Cr net loss, further obscured by a 500% surge in interest capitalization.	Core operational profitability has turned deeply negative, with the bottom line now heavily dependent on aggressive accounting maneuvers to defer cost recognition.
Working Capital	Inventory stood at ₹12,058 Cr (5.5x revenue) with significant legacy foreign receivable write-offs.	Inventory turnover ballooned to 2,824 days with 99% of the ₹12,433 Cr value stagnant in land and infrastructure.	The working capital cycle has reached a point of total stagnation, signaling a massive, multi-year capital lock-up in non-productive land assets.
Debt Trajectory	Artificially deleveraged via a ₹3,908 Cr equity raise, reducing debt to ₹4,594 Cr at 13.5% interest.	Debt increased to ₹5,322 Cr with a dangerous shift toward high-cost NCDs carrying 18.1% to 18.3% IRR.	The temporary solvency gained from massive equity dilution is being rapidly eroded by a return to distressed borrowing levels that exceed the company's return profile.
Management Tone	Survivalist and defensive, focused on navigating NCLT merger hurdles and legacy regulatory scrutiny.	Hyper-aggressive and expansionary, marked by the elevation of the next generation of the promoter family to key executive roles.	Management has pivoted to a high-growth narrative to decouple the brand from its legacy while tightening family control over professional management.

7.2 Persistent patterns

- **Negative Core Operational Profitability**: In both periods, the company failed to generate positive profit from core operations, relying on impairments in the prior year and one-time gains or capitalization in the current year to bridge the gap.
- **Masked Managerial Costs**: Management continues the aggressive practice of **paying high KMP remuneration (₹4.89 Cr to ₹5.53 Cr) through subsidiaries or despite "inadequate profits"** to keep parent-level overhead artificially low.
- **Severe Economic Value Destruction**: The company's **ROCE (ranging from -2% to 4%) remains perpetually and significantly below its cost of debt (13.5% to 18.3%)**, indicating a structural erosion of shareholder wealth.
- **High Related-Party Dependency**: The entity functions as a **central treasury for the promoter ecosystem**, with RPT volumes (advances and unbilled revenue) consistently representing a massive portion of financial activity relative to cash flow.
- **Chronic Inventory Stagnation**: A massive portion of the balance sheet (over ₹12,000 Cr) is **permanently locked in land and infrastructure**, resulting in a structurally illiquid working capital cycle and high inventory days.

- **Distressed Debt Reliance**: The company remains unable to access low-cost institutional capital, consistently relying on **high-yield NCDs and ICDs with rates as high as 18-23%** to fund its "cash-burn for growth" phase.
- **Structural Non-Comparability**: The use of **reverse acquisition accounting and "Point in Time" revenue recognition** continues to make year-over-year financial comparisons difficult, effectively masking legacy performance issues.