Embassy Developments Ltd — FY 2025 Annual Report Analysis

Annual Report Analysis (Consolidated)

Investor Snapshot

#	Analytical point	Sentiment
1	**Embassy Developments operates a scaled 36.6M sq. ft. portfolio with a GDV of □49,200 Cr, following a transformative reverse merger that repositioned the entity as a major luxury real estate player.**	—
2	**Revenue surged 83% YoY to □2,180 Cr, though this growth is primarily non-organic, driven by the consolidation of NAM Estates rather than pure operational expansion.**	—
3	***Core operating profitability remains negative at - 44 Cr when excluding a one-time 308 Cr investment sale gain, indicating that the business is not yet self-sustaining from its primary activities.***	—
4	**Reported PAT of □194 Cr is heavily inflated by tax credits and non-recurring gains, masking a thin Pre-Tax Profit (PBT) of only □27 Cr.**	—
5	**The company successfully executed a massive □3,155 Cr deleveraging exercise via a □3,908 Cr equity raise, significantly improving the Debt/Equity ratio to 0.49x.**	—
6	**Operating cash flow turned positive at □1,461 Cr, underpinned by strong customer collections and advances totaling □2,692 Cr, which provides medium-term revenue visibility.**	—
7	***Capital efficiency is severely compromised with an ROCE of 3%, which fails to cover the high cost of debt ranging from 13.5% for NCDs to 23% for inter-corporate deposits.***	—
8	***Earnings quality is low due to 952 Cr in impairments and write-offs, including 655 Cr in foreign receivables, suggesting a history of value-destructive capital allocation.***	—
9	***Governance risks are acute with Related Party Transactions (RPT) accounting for 70.58% of revenue and a 385 Cr non-operational advance provided to promoter entities.***	—
10	***Inventory levels of 12,058 Cr represent a 5.5-year sales overhang, indicating a stretched working capital cycle and high sensitivity to luxury segment absorption rates.***	—
11	The outlook depends on the successful launch of 10+ projects in FY26 to achieve □5,000 Cr in pre-sales and transition from a distressed legacy to a growth-oriented vehicle.	—
12	Stance: Watch; monitor for a reduction in finance costs below 10% of revenue and a contraction of RPTs to below 15% before committing capital.	—

Final research summary: embassy developments ltd (edl)

1. Business overview

- **Structural Pivot:** FY 2025 marks the completion of the merger with NAM Estates (effective Jan 24, 2025), transitioning the company from the distressed Indiabulls legacy to the flagship development arm of the Embassy Group.
- **Accounting Reality:** While EDL is the legal acquirer, NAM Estates is the accounting acquirer; FY25 financials reflect Embassy's historical operations, effectively erasing the legacy Indiabulls operational history.
- **Core Segments:** The business has shifted to a concentrated Premium Residential and Commercial play, focusing on high-velocity markets in Bengaluru (60%+) and Mumbai (MMR).

- **Scale & Pipeline:** The entity controls a 36.6 million sq. ft. portfolio with a ₹49,200 Cr Gross Development Value (GDV), supported by a 3,100-acre land bank.
- **Asset Strategy:** Transitioning toward a "Capital-Light" Development Management (DM) model for new projects (e.g., Embassy Bayview) while retaining high-yield flagship assets like Embassy Blu (Mumbai).
- **Revenue Drivers:** Primarily driven by "Sale of Land and Properties," which contributed 97.06% of total revenue in FY25.
- **Cost Drivers:** Dominated by Land and Construction costs (73.5% of revenue) and high Finance Costs (21.1% of revenue) due to expensive debt structures.
- **Monetization:** Strategic sale of non-core assets, such as the ₹1,125 Cr Whitefield office park land transaction, to fund core premium project construction.

2. Management commentary & outlook

- Management has shifted the narrative from "survival and litigation" to "aggressive expansion" following the merger completion.
- The strategic intent is to replicate the "Embassy REIT success" within EDL by developing, stabilizing, and potentially dropping down commercial assets into a REIT to recycle capital.
- Aggressive FY2026 guidance has been set with a Pre-sales target of ₹5,000 Cr (1.5x increase over FY25) and a Collection target of ₹2,200 Cr.
- Execution of this guidance requires the simultaneous launch of 10-11 new projects, presenting significant operational risk.
- The company is seeking approval for a 10% Development Management & Marketing Fee on major projects, which management justifies via independent benchmarking but serves as a significant revenue stream for the parent.
- A ₹100 Cr advance to the Promoter Group (EPDPL) for a "Future Asset Agreement" has been extended to May 2027, suggesting regulatory or title hurdles in exercising Right of First Refusal (ROFR).
- Management highlights the participation of institutional investors like Blackstone and Baillie Gifford in the ₹3,908 Cr capital raise as a "Governance Halo."
- The "Unified Platform" strategy aims to integrate 720+ employees across Mumbai and Bengaluru, though organizational integration remains a "soft" risk to delivery timelines.
- Management Tone: The tone is "Hyper-Confident & Opportunistic." The Chairman’s message ("The fun has just begun!") signals a shift to a promoter-led, growth-hungry board. While successfully moving past legacy issues, the heavy reliance on RPT-driven fees and extended advances to promoters suggests the company continues to function as a central treasury for the broader Embassy ecosystem.

3. Financial analysis

3.1 Financial statements

P&L statement (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2025	Mar 2024
Sales	2,180	1,188
Sales Growth %	83	102
Expenses	1,887	1,182
Material Cost %	0	0
Change in inventory	0	0
Manufacturing Cost %	75	80
Employee Cost %	5	5
Other Cost %	6	15
Operating Profit	293	6
OPM %	13	1
Other Income	210	29
Exceptional items	157	1
Other income normal	53	29
Interest	461	556
Depreciation	15	7
Profit before tax	27	-527
Tax %	-643	-8
Net Profit	194	-517
Profit from Associates	-9	-32
Minority share	6	20
Exceptional items AT	100	1
Profit excl Excep	94	-518
Profit for PE	100	-498
Profit for EPS	200	-497
Profit Growth %	120	-24
EPS (□)	1.63	-9.18
Dividend Payout %	0	0

Balance sheet (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2025	Mar 2024
Equity Capital	244	108
Reserves	9,077	-1,555
Borrowings	4,594	7,749
Long term Borrowings	2,515	4,391
Short term Borrowings	2,011	3,357
Lease Liabilities	68	0
Preference Capital	0	0
Other Borrowings	0	0
Other Liabilities	6,572	3,637
Non controlling int	6	546
Trade Payables	906	254
Advance from Customers	2,692	1,587
Other liability items	2,969	1,250
Total Liabilities	20,488	9,939
Fixed Assets	6,089	3,737
Land	0	0
Building	103	0
Plant Machinery	10	0
Ships Vessels	0	0
Equipments	1	0
Computers	3	1
Furniture n fittings	1	0
Vehicles	37	29
Intangible Assets	2,516	0
Other fixed assets	3,514	3,739
Gross Block	6,185	3,769
Accumulated Depreciation	95	32
CWIP	9	0
Investments	98	867
Other Assets	14,291	5,335
Inventories	12,058	3,351
Trade receivables	52	234
Receivables over 6m	35.49	210.97
Receivables under 6m	18.06	22.68
Prov for Doubtful	-1.81	0
Cash Equivalents	414	86

Line item	Mar 2025	Mar 2024
Loans n Advances	171	57
Other asset items	1,597	1,607
Total Assets	20,488	9,939

Cash flow statement (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2025	Mar 2024
Cash from Operating Activity	1,461	-97
Profit from operations	-44	-116
Receivables	293	13
Inventory	1,449	-20
Payables	274	-27
Loans Advances	0	0
Other WC items	-470	62
Working capital changes	1,546	28
Direct taxes	0	-9
Other operating items	-42	0
Cash from Investing Activity	507	96
Fixed assets purchased	0	-2
Fixed assets sold	0	0
Investments purchased	-539	-150
Investments sold	34	279
Interest received	66	49
Dividends received	0	0
Invest in subsidiaries	0	0
Redemp n Canc of Shares	457	0
Inter corporate deposits	660	0
Other investing items	-171	-80
Cash from Financing Activity	-1,971	-8
Proceeds from shares	335	0
Proceeds from debentures	40	175
Redemption of debentures	0	-266
Proceeds from borrowings	366	189
Repayment of borrowings	-2,102	-49
Interest paid fin	-610	-48
Dividends paid	0	0
Financial liabilities	0	-9
Other financing items	0	0
Net Cash Flow	-3	-10
Free Cash Flow	1,461	-100
CFO/OP	498	-1,450

Key ratios

Line item	Mar 2025	Mar 2024
Debtor Days	9	72
Inventory Days	0	0
Days Payable	0	0
Cash Conversion Cycle	9	72
Working Capital Days	935	-505
ROCE %	3	1

3.2 Financial analysis summary

- **Revenue** grew by 83% to □2,180.00 Cr, primarily driven by the "Sale of Land and Properties" (97.06% of total); however, this growth is non-organic as it reflects the reverse acquisition of NAM Estates, which also caused Reserves to swing from negative □1,555.00 Cr to positive □9,077.00 Cr on the Balance Sheet.
- **Operating Profit** margins improved to 13% from 1% YoY, but PAT of □194.00 Cr was heavily supported by Other Income of □367.05 Cr, which included a one-time profit of □308.37 Cr from the sale of Investments, masking a weak core operational performance where Profit from operations remained negative at -□44.00 Cr in the Cash Flow Statement.
- **Finance Cost** remains a critical drag at □461.00 Cr (21.14% of Revenue), with new NCD issuances carrying high interest rates of 13.50% p.a., while Interest paid in the Cash Flow Statement spiked to □610.00 Cr, indicating the company is servicing high-cost debt even as Total Debt decreased to □4,594.00 Cr.
- **Inventory** skyrocketed by 260% to □12,058.00 Cr, representing 5.5x annual Revenue, signaling a massive capital lock-up in land and under-construction projects and explaining the high Working Capital Days of 935 days.
- **Trade Receivables** improved significantly, dropping to □52.00 Cr from □234.00 Cr, which combined with a surge in Advance from Customers to □2,692.00 Cr, fueled a positive CFO of 1,461.00 Cr despite low accounting profits.
- **Trade Payables** nearly quadrupled to □906.00 Cr, indicating the company is stretching vendor payments to manage liquidity, further evidenced by interest payable on MSME dues reaching □9.12 Cr.
- **Capital Allocation** concerns are highlighted by a □655.13 Cr provision for doubtful receivables in a foreign subsidiary and a □297.05 Cr impairment of Investments, suggesting significant historical value leakage.
- **Related Party** reliance is high, with □1,153.58 Cr in unsecured loans from related parties at 13.25% interest and a massive □385.00 Cr cash outflow as an Advance for Purchase of Shares to related entities, restricting FCF availability for core operations.
- **Fixed Assets** increased to □6,089.00 Cr, largely due to the recognition of □2,516.00 Cr in Intangible Assets and □3,288.19 Cr in investment properties following the merger; Depreciation remains low at □15.00 Cr as land-based assets are not amortized.
- **Interest Coverage** is precariously low at 1.06x, indicating that the company's EBIT barely covers its Finance Cost, making it dependent on Other Income and fresh Equity Capital (□335.00 Cr raised in FY25) to sustain debt obligations.
- **Other Liabilities** include a □645.00 Cr "Unsecured financial liability" that appeared in FY25 without a detailed breakdown, serving as a "dumping bucket" for miscellaneous obligations.
- **Other Expenses** were impacted by a □655.13 Cr provision for doubtful receivables in Brenformexa Ltd (UK) and a □233.98 Cr provision for customer incentives, both of which significantly drag down the bottom line.

- The dominant financial theme of the year is a **Balance Sheet** transformation via reverse merger that has masked weak core operational profitability with one-time investment gains and high-interest related-party funding.

3.3 Contingent liabilities & commitments

- **Tax Disputes:** Income Tax paid under protest amounting to ₹0.035 Cr, signaling ongoing disputes with tax authorities.
- **Guarantees:** Bank deposits of ₹11.43 Cr are specifically pledged against guarantees given to Haryana government authorities (DTCP, GMDA), restricting free cash flow. Total Bank Guarantees pledged via FDs stand at ₹18.86 Cr.
- **Contagion Risk:** A major HDFC Bank loan of ₹1,213.63 Cr is secured by a 100% share pledge of the subsidiary Embassy Infra Developers.

3.9 Earnings quality & forensic checks

#	Check	Impact	Status	Notes detail
1	PAT vs CFO trend	Profit ↑ — high customer advances of ₹2,692 Cr boost cash flow despite low PBT.	—	: Advances exceed annual revenue, driving strong operating cash inflows.
2	Receivables & channel-stuffing signal	Revenue ↑↓ — inventory growth of 260% dwarfs 83% sales growth, signaling potential stalling.	—	: Inventory scale is 5.5x revenue, indicating a very long working capital cycle.
3	Revenue timing	Revenue ↑ — conservative point-in-time recognition defers revenue until occupancy certificate is received.	—	: Revenue recognized only upon project completion, leading to high future earnings visibility.
4	Revenue from related parties %	Neutral — core revenue is property sales; financial risk lies in RPT loans.	—	: Most revenue is third-party; RPTs are primarily financial/funding in nature.
5	Inventory vs revenue growth	Profit ↓ — massive inventory build-up suggests capital lock-up and rising holding costs.	—	: Surge largely due to reverse acquisition, but indicates high project execution risk.
6	Inventory valuation method change	Profit ↑ — capitalizing ₹24.99 Cr interest into inventory defers expenses to future periods.	—	: Policy allows interest capitalization into land, artificially reducing current finance costs.
7	Exceptional items in operating profit	Profit ↑ — non-recurring investment sale profit of ₹308 Cr masks weak operations.	—	: Core operating profit is significantly lower when excluding one-time investment gains.
8	Depreciation rate vs useful life policy	Profit ↑ — non-amortization of ₹3,288 Cr investment properties prevents a P&L charge.	—	: Land-based investment properties with infinite life are not depreciated, protecting margins.
9	Provision reversals boosting PAT	Profit ↓ — massive ₹655 Cr write-off of foreign receivables indicates historical capital leakage.	—	: Provision for Brenformexa Ltd receivables suggests poor recoverability of overseas funds.
10	Tax rate consistency	Profit ↑ — negative tax rate of -643% provides a massive non-cash PAT boost.	—	: Tax credits and merger-related adjustments result in a tax benefit instead of expense.
11	CWIP age and stalling projects	Neutral — low CWIP as most development costs are correctly classified as inventory.	—	: Real estate accounting shifts construction costs to inventory rather than CWIP.
12	Deferred tax asset recognition	Profit ↑ — recognition of tax benefits significantly inflates PAT relative to pre-tax earnings.	—	: Reverse acquisition accounting creates complex tax asset/liability revaluations impacting PAT.
13	RPT quantum and trend	Profit ↓ — high-interest related party debt at 13.25%+ indicates expensive internal funding.	—	: Historical inter-corporate deposits reached rates as high as 23% p.a.
14	Dividend paid vs FCF adequacy	Neutral — zero dividends despite high FCF as cash is prioritized for deleveraging.	—	: Cash flow utilized to repay ₹2,102 Cr of borrowings during the year.
15	Auditor KAM: Merger Valuation	Profit ↑↓ — Significant management estimates used in PPA for NAM Estates merger.	—	: Fair value of net assets acquired vs consideration issued impacts balance sheet strength.
16	Auditor KAM: Cost Estimation	Profit ↓ — Underestimation of future construction costs would hit future margins.	—	: Management estimates for "cost to be incurred" are critical for margin stability.
17	Legacy Investment Impairment	Profit ↓ — Massive impairment of unquoted investments indicates historical value destruction.	—	: Write-downs in Jagati Publications and Avinash Bhosale Infra signal past capital leakage.

#	Check	Impact	Status	Notes detail
18	MSME Payment Delays	Neutral — Interest on delayed dues signals tight operational liquidity.	—	: Stretched payables to MSMEs despite large capital raise.

4. Management & governance

A. Auditor Report & Key Audit Matters * **Audit opinion type:** Unqualified. * **KAM 1: Business Combination & Reverse Acquisition Accounting:** The auditor focused on the valuation and Purchase Price Allocation (PPA) for the merger of NAM Estates. Management used significant estimates to determine the fair value of net assets acquired, impacting Capital Reserve/Goodwill. * **KAM 2: Estimation of Project Costs:** Management uses "percentage of completion" or "point in time" estimates for future costs. The auditor flagged that any underestimation of future construction costs would lead to material margin hits in subsequent years. * **KAM 3: Impairment of Investments and Receivables:** The auditor scrutinized the recoverability of unquoted investments and foreign receivables, leading to massive write-downs in FY25 (□297 Cr and □655 Cr respectively). * **Emphasis of Matter:** Note 41 highlights that the reverse acquisition makes FY25 and FY24 figures non-comparable. * **Auditor Fees:** Proposed at □1.80 Cr for FY26 with a 10% annual escalation clause.

B. Related Party Transactions

Party	Relationship	Nature	Amount (□ Cr)	Concern
Embassy Property Dev.	Promoter Group	Loans Outstanding	719.54 Cr	***High-interest dependency (13.25%+)***
Related Parties (Various)	Promoter Group	Advance for Share Purchase	385.00 Cr	***Cash leakage; non-operational outflow***
WeWork India Mgmt	Associate	Inter-corporate Deposits	434.04 Cr	***Extremely high interest (up to 23%)***
Embassy Property Dev.	Promoter Group	Future Asset Advance	100.00 Cr	***Locked capital; extended till 2027***
Birch Real Estate	Subsidiary of Promoter	DM Fee Arrangement	306.00 Cr	***Potential for fee-siphoning (10% of Rev)***

- **RPT Risk Checks:** Aggregate RPT (□1,538.58 Cr) represents 70.58% of Revenue and 105.31% of CFO, signaling **Severe Risk** and Cash Leakage.
- **Red Flags:** □385 Cr advance for share purchase and □100 Cr Future Asset Advance signal capital allocation toward promoter-linked entities rather than project execution. The 10% DM fee is at the upper end of industry standards.

C. Shareholding * **Promoters:** 42.66% (Jump from 0% due to reclassification post-merger). * **FII:** 18.54% (Down from 21.85% in Dec 2024). * **DII:** 1.42%. * **Public:** 37.38%. * **Pledged Shares:** 0.00% of promoter holding.

D. Board Composition + KMP Compensation * **Total Directors:** 8 | **Independent %:** 50.00% | **Women Directors:** 1 (Tarana Lalwani). * **Sachin Shah (CEO):** Remuneration of □4.89 Cr (25.38% YoY growth). Paid entirely via subsidiary Equinox India Infraestate Ltd, continuing the practice of masking parent-level costs. * **Transparency Gap:** Remuneration for Managing Director (Aditya Virwani) and CFO (Rajesh Kaimal) is not explicitly broken out in the provided notes.

F. Capital Allocation & Capex

Action	FY current (□Cr)	FY prior (□Cr)	% of CFO	Signal
Acquisitions	1,853.00	0.00	126.83%	—
Net Debt Change	-3,155.00	7,056.00	-215.95%	—
Impairments / Write-offs	952.18	35,829.40	65.17%	—
Loans to Related Parties	385.00	0.00	26.35%	—
Equity Issuance	3,908.14	0.00	267.50%	—
Interest Payments	610.00	48.00	41.75%	—

- **CAPEX Analytical Notes:**
  - **CFO Coverage:** N/M. Fixed asset purchase was 0.00 Cr; growth is via SPV acquisitions.
  - **Nature: Acquisitions of □1,853 Cr** (Blu, Sky Forest) represent the core growth strategy.
  - **Efficiency:** Low. Despite the massive asset base, ROCE is only 3%, far below the 13.5% cost of debt.
  - **Takeaway: The shift to SPV-based acquisitions increases balance sheet complexity and RPT risk, evidenced by the □385 Cr advance to related parties.**

H. Risks * ***Foreign Receivable Recovery:*** □655.13 Cr provision for Brenformexa Ltd (UK). **Impact: Total loss of historical overseas capital; 30% of FY25 Revenue.** (Severity: High) * ***High Cost of Debt:*** NCDs at 13.5% and ICDs at 23%. **Impact: Interest expense (□461 Cr) consumes 157% of Operating Profit.** (Severity: High) * ***Contagion Risk:*** □1,213 Cr HDFC loan secured by 100% share pledge of subsidiary. **Impact: Default at subsidiary level could trigger loss of core assets.** (Severity: High) * ***Inventory Overhang:*** Inventory (□12,058 Cr) is 5.5x annual revenue. **Impact: Severe working capital lock-up; risk of further valuation write-downs.** (Severity: High) * ***Reverse Merger Complexity:*** NAM Estates is accounting acquirer. **Impact: Historical financials are non-comparable; masks legacy EDL performance.** (Severity: Med)

5. Scorecard & verdict

Part a: scorecard

Dimension	Rating (1–5)	Delta	Key evidence	One-line rationale
Business quality	3	—	36.6M sq ft portfolio; 5.5x Inventory/Sales	Strong asset base but high cyclicality and execution risk in luxury segment.
Financial health	2	—	D/E 0.49x; Interest Coverage 1.06x	Debt reduced via equity, but interest costs consume operating profit.
Earnings quality	2	—	PAT □194 Cr vs PBT □27 Cr; □308 Cr Inv. Sale	PAT heavily inflated by tax credits and non-recurring investment gains.
Management & governance	2	—	RPT = 70% of Revenue; □385 Cr RP Advance	Significant capital leakage to promoter entities and high RPT dependency.
Capital allocation & earnings visibility	2	—	ROCE 3% < Debt Cost 13.5%; □952 Cr Write-offs	Value-destructive returns and history of significant capital impairments.

Business positives (for this company this year) * **Successful Deleveraging:** Reduced borrowings by □3,155 Cr, bringing Debt/Equity down to 0.49x via a □3,908 Cr equity raise. * **Strong Sales Pipeline:** Advances from customers reached □2,692 Cr, exceeding annual revenue and providing future earnings visibility. * **Institutional Validation:** Secured □3,908 Cr from marquee investors including Blackstone and Baillie Gifford. * **Asset Base Expansion:** Controlled portfolio increased to 36.6 million sq. ft. with a GDV of □49,200 Cr post-merger. *

Positive Operating Cash Flow: Reported CFO of □1,461 Cr, driven by strong collections and customer advances.

Business negatives / concerns (for this company this year) * **Severe RPT Risk:** Related party transactions account for 70.58% of revenue, including a □385 Cr non-operational advance for share purchases. * **Weak Core Profitability:** Core operating profit is negative (-□44 Cr) when excluding one-time investment gains of □308 Cr. * **High Cost of Capital:** Servicing debt at rates as high as 13.5% (NCDs) and 23% (ICDs), while ROCE remains a meager 3%. * **Massive Capital Leakage:** Recognized □952.18 Cr in impairments and provisions, including a □655 Cr write-off of foreign receivables. * **Inventory Overhang:** Inventory of □12,058 Cr represents 5.5 years of sales, indicating a severely stretched working capital cycle. * **Low Interest Coverage:** EBIT barely covers interest obligations (1.06x), making the company dependent on non-core income.

OVERALL SCORECARD SUMMARY Embassy Developments Ltd has successfully navigated a near-death experience through a massive equity-funded deleveraging and a transformative merger. However, the financial strength is superficial, as core operations remain unprofitable and interest costs are unsustainably high relative to returns. Governance remains the primary concern, with significant cash leakage to promoter-linked entities and a high degree of RPT dependency. While the business is on a "stable" trajectory in terms of solvency, it remains on a "deteriorating" trajectory regarding capital discipline and minority shareholder alignment.

Part b: governance check matrix

#	Check	Status
1	Audit opinion clean?	—
2	Promoter pledge = 0?	—
3	KMP pay < 5% of PAT?	—
4	RPT quantum < 5% of revenue?	—
5	Board > 50% independent?	—
6	At least 1 woman director?	—
7	No statutory dues outstanding?	—
8	No fraud reported?	—
9	Audit trail enabled?	—
10	Frequent Auditor change	—

Final line: "Total: 8/10 — Governance Rating: 2" (Rating downgraded due to extreme RPT quantum)

Part c: investor verdict

Thesis: A high-beta play on premium Indian real estate, transitioning from a distressed legacy to a growth vehicle, but marred by aggressive promoter-centric capital allocation.

Overall stance: Watch

Rationale: While the asset base and sales pipeline are strong, the high cost of debt and significant RPT leakage offset the operational turnaround. Re-evaluate when: ROCE exceeds 10% or RPT as a % of revenue drops below 15%. BULL CASE: Successful launch of 10+ projects in FY26 leading to □5,000 Cr pre-sales and a credit rating upgrade. BEAR CASE: Slowdown in Mumbai luxury absorption leads to inventory write-downs and inability to service 13.5% NCDs. Key monitorable: Finance Cost as % of Revenue: 21.1% → watch threshold < 10%.

7. Year-over-year analysis

7.1 Changes

Metric / theme	Summary a status	Summary b status	Forensic takeaway
Capital Allocation	Dominated by a massive ₹35,829 Cr "kitchen-sinking" impairment of legacy ICDs and subsidiary assets.	Shifted to SPV-based acquisitions (₹1,853 Cr) and non-operational advances to related parties (₹385 Cr).	The company has transitioned from purging legacy value destruction to aggressive, promoter-linked capital deployment that continues to favor the broader ecosystem over minority shareholders.
Debt Trajectory	Critical distress with debt doubling to ₹7,749 Cr and an interest coverage ratio of 0.05x.	Deleveraged to ₹4,594 Cr following a ₹3,908 Cr equity raise, though interest coverage remains precarious at 1.06x.	Solvency has been artificially restored through massive equity dilution rather than organic operational cash flow.
Margin Trajectory	Non-existent due to zero Ind AS 115 revenue and total operational standstill.	Reported 13% OPM, but PAT is heavily inflated by a ₹308 Cr one-time investment sale and negative tax rates.	Core operational profitability remains negative, with the bottom line currently dependent on non-recurring gains and accounting adjustments.
Working Capital	Stagnant inventory of ₹4,902 Cr and overdue London receivables.	Inventory skyrocketed 260% to ₹12,058 Cr (5.5x annual revenue) with a new ₹655 Cr write-off of foreign receivables.	The working capital cycle has become severely bloated post-merger, signaling a massive capital lock-up in slow-moving land assets.
Management Tone	Survivalist, focused on "managed liquidation" and navigating NCLT merger blocks.	Hyper-confident and opportunistic, emphasizing aggressive pre-sales targets and a "unified platform" strategy.	Management has pivoted to a high-growth narrative to decouple the brand from legacy Indiabulls-era regulatory scrutiny.

7.2 Persistent patterns

- **Negative Core Operational Profitability:** In both periods, the company failed to generate positive profit from core operations, relying on impairments in the prior year and one-time gains in the current year to bridge the gap.
- **Masked Managerial Costs:** Management continues the aggressive practice of **paying KMP remuneration through subsidiaries** (₹3.90 Cr in FY24; ₹4.89 Cr in FY25) to keep parent-level overhead artificially low.
- **Value-Destructive Return Profile:** The company's **ROCE (1% to 3%) remains consistently and significantly below its cost of debt (13.5% to 23%)**, indicating persistent erosion of economic value.
- **Chronic Capital Leakage:** Both years are characterized by **massive write-offs and impairments** (₹35,829 Cr in FY24; ₹952 Cr in FY25), suggesting a structural inability to protect capital once deployed.
- **High Related-Party Dependency:** The entity functions as a **central treasury for the promoter ecosystem**, with RPTs consistently representing a massive portion of financial activity (70% of revenue in the current year).
- **Regulatory and Legal Overhang:** Despite the rebranding, the company remains entangled in **complex litigation and regulatory scrutiny**, moving from NCLT merger delays to SEBI Show Cause Notices.
- **Stretched Working Capital:** The business model remains **structurally illiquid**, with inventory levels consistently dwarfing annual sales velocity, leading to extreme working capital days.