Embassy Developments Ltd — FY 2023 Annual Report Analysis

Annual Report Analysis (Consolidated)

Investor Snapshot

#	Analytical point	Sentiment
1	**Indiabulls Real Estate is currently operating as a distressed holding company in a state of managed liquidation, pivoting from active development to land bank monetization.**	—
2	***Core operational revenue collapsed by 59% YoY to 587 Cr, with 38% of the top-line artificially supported by one-time subsidiary divestments rather than project sales.***	—
3	***EBITDA margins crashed to -60.65% as manufacturing and construction costs reached 110% of sales, reflecting a total breakdown in operational efficiency.***	—
4	***The company reported a massive Net Loss of 608 Cr, exacerbated by 224 Cr in exceptional write-offs and a value-destructive ROCE of -7%.***	—
5	**Aggressive deleveraging reduced total borrowings by 48% to ₹693 Cr (D/E 0.21x), funded via a ₹854 Cr QIP and ₹837 Cr in strategic asset sales.**	—
6	***Cash flow from operations remains deeply negative at - 343 Cr, indicating that the core business is burning cash and cannot self-sustain without external capital or asset fire-sales.***	—
7	**The company realized ₹584 Cr from the sale of Sector 106 Gurgaon land, utilizing its 3,000+ acre land bank as a critical liquidity backstop to stabilize the balance sheet.**	—
8	***Earnings quality is severely impaired by a 329 Cr receivable write-off and a 629 Cr London receivable that is now over 24 months overdue, posing significant impairment risk.***	—
9	***Governance remains a high-risk factor with 3,372 Cr (92% of total loans) tied up in related-party loans at nil interest, representing massive capital diversion.***	—
10	***Strategic growth is entirely stalled following the NCLT Chandigarh's refusal to sanction the Embassy merger, leaving the company without a clear operational pipeline.***	—
11	**New leadership has initiated a "kitchen-sinking" of legacy bad assets and provided transparent disclosures regarding historical governance gaps.**	—
12	**Investment Stance: Watch; the primary monitorables are the NCLAT merger appeal outcome and the successful recovery of the ₹629 Cr London receivable.**	—

1. Business overview (In Bullet Points)

- **Business Segments:** Indiabulls Real Estate (IBREL) is a real estate developer focused on luxury, premium, and mid-income residential segments, with a portfolio including flagship projects like Blu Estate and Sky Forest.
- **Revenue Drivers:** Currently skewed toward the monetization of finished inventory and the completion of legacy projects. A significant portion of FY23 revenue (approx. 38%) was derived from inorganic gains on the sale of subsidiaries and land bank monetization.
- **Cost Drivers:** Impacted by ₹254 Cr in cost escalations and over ₹950 Cr in total one-time provisions and write-offs. Manufacturing costs surged to 110% of sales, and other costs rose to 33% due to losses on subsidiary divestments.

- **Industry Position:** Characterized as a "company in limbo" during a transition to a professionally managed entity. It holds a massive, underutilized land bank of 3,000+ acres, including a 1,424-acre SEZ in Nashik, but execution has lagged behind "Grade A" peers.
- **Expansion Plans & Strategy:** Shifting toward an asset-light model involving JVs and Development Fee arrangements to de-risk the balance sheet and leverage the "Embassy" brand equity post-merger.
- **Acquisitions & Divestments:** Aggressively liquidating non-core assets, including the sale of subsidiaries holding land in Gurugram (Airmid, Mariana, etc.) for approximately ₹837 Cr to boost liquidity.
- **Capacity & Delivery:** Historically delivered 30 million sq. ft.; current focus is on completing existing projects in Sky Forest, Blu, and Thane.
- **Geographical Presence:** Concentrated in high-value markets of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) and National Capital Region (NCR).

2. Management commentary & outlook

- Management describes the current state as a "repair and reset" phase, admitting the company failed to capitalize on the residential bull market due to a leadership vacuum and merger delays.
- The immediate priority is the completion of existing projects (Sky Forest, Blu, Thane) to improve customer centricity and meet delivery timelines.
- Management issued a warning that the next two quarters will be "subdued" due to a lack of new launches and the depletion of current inventory.
- A launch pipeline with a Gross Development Value (GDV) exceeding ₹4,300 Cr has been identified for Thane, Worli, Alibaug, and Gurgaon, planned for late 2023 and early 2024.
- The merger with Embassy remains the single largest strategic overhang; management is aggressively contesting the NCLT Chandigarh's refusal to sanction the merger in the NCLAT.
- Management has questioned the validity of amendments made by "erstwhile management" regarding the ₹629 Cr London Receivable, signaling internal friction and a commitment to rectifying past governance gaps.
- The strategy involves a transition to an asset-light model to navigate the regulatory environment without the backing of the original promoter.
- Management Tone: The tone is **Transparently Corrective and Cautiously Optimistic**. Leadership is making a deliberate effort to distance itself from prior "lags in decision making" by taking massive one-time write-offs and providing blunt disclosures about near-term weakness. While the intent to clean up the balance sheet is evident, execution remains hostage to legal outcomes and the recovery of related-party dues.

3. Financial analysis

3.1 Financial statements

P&L statement (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2023	Mar 2022
Sales	587	1,445
Sales Growth %	-59	-5
Expenses	942	1,446
Material Cost %	0	0
Change in inventory	0	0
Manufacturing Cost %	110	83
Employee Cost %	18	5
Other Cost %	33	12
Operating Profit	-356	-1
OPM %	-61	0
Other Income	-167	96
Exceptional items	-224	3
Other income normal	56	93
Interest	28	110
Depreciation	12	12
Profit before tax	-563	-27
Tax %	8	409
Net Profit	-608	-137
Profit from Associates	0	0
Minority share	-1	1
Exceptional items AT	-206	3
Profit excl Excep	-402	-141
Profit for PE	-403	-140
Profit for EPS	-608	-137
Profit Growth %	-187	-3,422
EPS (□)	-11.23	-3
Dividend Payout %	0	0

Balance sheet (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2023	Mar 2022
Equity Capital	108	91
Reserves	3,122	3,324
Borrowings	693	1,329
Long term Borrowings	164	345
Short term Borrowings	92	965
Lease Liabilities	12	19
Preference Capital	425	0
Other Borrowings	0	0
Other Liabilities	2,664	3,007
Non controlling int	12	11
Trade Payables	422	344
Advance from Customers	1,843	2,230
Other liability items	386	422
Total Liabilities	6,587	7,751
Fixed Assets	83	96
Land	0	0
Building	36	36
Plant Machinery	28	40
Ships Vessels	1	1
Equipments	1	1
Computers	4	5
Furniture n fittings	1	3
Vehicles	4	11
Intangible Assets	0	0
Other fixed assets	108	99
Gross Block	181	196
Accumulated Depreciation	99	99
CWIP	0	0
Investments	157	269
Other Assets	6,347	7,385
Inventories	4,902	5,521
Trade receivables	76	273
Receivables over 6m	86.36	232.92
Receivables under 6m	3.16	55.59
Prov for Doubtful	-13.50	-15.09
Cash Equivalents	137	121

Line item	Mar 2023	Mar 2022
Loans n Advances	46	26
Other asset items	1,186	1,444
Total Assets	6,587	7,751

Cash flow statement (□Cr)

Line item	Mar 2023	Mar 2022
Cash from Operating Activity	-343	-248
Profit from operations	-492	115
Receivables	197	12
Inventory	-81	707
Payables	108	44
Loans Advances	0	0
Other WC items	-161	-1,149
Working capital changes	63	-386
Direct taxes	86	24
Other operating items	0	0
Cash from Investing Activity	661	280
Fixed assets purchased	-1	-1
Fixed assets sold	1	0
Investments purchased	-595	-67
Investments sold	636	18
Interest received	24	19
Dividends received	0	0
Invest in subsidiaries	0	0
Redemp n Canc of Shares	853	0
Inter corporate deposits	0	0
Other investing items	-257	311
Cash from Financing Activity	-331	-64
Proceeds from shares	854	8
Proceeds from debentures	200	594
Redemption of debentures	-753	-170
Proceeds from borrowings	88	362
Repayment of borrowings	-600	-681
Interest paid fin	-111	-171
Dividends paid	0	0
Financial liabilities	-9	-6
Other financing items	0	0
Net Cash Flow	-13	-31
Free Cash Flow	-343	-248
CFO/OP	121	25,878

Key ratios

Line item	Mar 2023	Mar 2022
Debtor Days	47	69
Inventory Days	0	0
Days Payable	0	0
Cash Conversion Cycle	47	69
Working Capital Days	2,186	789
ROCE %	-7	2

3.2 Financial analysis summary

- **Revenue** quality is severely compromised, with Sales declining 59% YoY to □587.00 Cr, of which □222.96 Cr (approx. 38% of reported top-line) is derived from inorganic gains on the sale of subsidiaries; this reliance on asset monetization rather than core development is further evidenced by the □584.00 Cr land sale in Gurgaon which bypasses the traditional project lifecycle.
- The company reported a massive **Operating Profit** loss of -□356.00 Cr and an EBITDA Margin of -60.65%, driven by a surge in Manufacturing Cost % to 110% and Other Cost % to 33%, which includes a significant □189.36 Cr loss on the divestment of Juventus Estate and Mabon Properties, signaling land parcels were liquidated below carrying values.
- **Net Profit** deteriorated to -□608.00 Cr, further pressured by Exceptional items of -□224.00 Cr which includes a massive internal cleanup involving the write-off of □329.44 Cr in Trade Receivables and advances, indicating historical bloating of the Balance Sheet.
- **Working Capital** remains a critical concern as Working Capital Days ballooned to 2,186 days; while Trade Receivables on the Balance Sheet decreased to □76.00 Cr, a massive □629.07 Cr receivable from a 2021 London property sale remains uncollected, posing a significant recoverability risk and contributing to the negative CFO of -□343.00 Cr.
- **Total Debt** (Borrowings) saw a substantial reduction from □1,329.00 Cr to □693.00 Cr, a deleveraging move funded by □661.00 Cr of Cash from Investing Activity, yet the Interest Coverage ratio remains deeply negative at -13.14 as the business fails to generate sufficient EBIT to service even the reduced Finance Cost.
- **Capital Allocation** is heavily skewed toward inter-corporate support, with Loans n Advances to related parties totaling □3,372.46 Cr, representing 92.68% of total loans granted, many of which are at "nil interest rates," signaling potential value leakage and inefficient use of Net Worth which stood at □3,230.00 Cr.
- **Cash Flow** quality is poor with a CFO / PAT ratio of 0.56 and a persistent Free Cash Flow deficit of -□343.00 Cr, forcing reliance on Proceeds from shares (□854.00 Cr) and asset sales to fund Repayment of borrowings of □1,353.00 Cr.
- **Return Metrics** have collapsed with ROCE at -7.00% and ROE at -18.82%, reflecting the inability of the Total Assets base of □6,587.00 Cr to generate positive returns, especially as Inventories of □4,902.00 Cr (74% of assets) are not converting into Revenue at a sufficient pace.
- **Other Expenses** house significant capital losses of □189.36 Cr from subsidiary sales, masking the true operational cost structure, while Other Assets (Standalone) are dominated by □3,588.26 Cr in current loans, indicating the holding company functions primarily as a financing vehicle.
- The dominant financial theme of the year is a **fundamental shift from development to liquidation**, where aggressive deleveraging through asset divestments has stabilized the Balance Sheet but left the entity operationally weakened with significant capital trapped in non-performing related-party loans.

3.3 Contingent liabilities & commitments

- **Disputed Income Tax Dues:** ₹8.95 Cr.
- **Disputed Service Tax Dues:** ₹27.04 Cr (pending before Assistant Commissioner and CESTAT regarding denial of input credit).
- **Disputed GST Dues:** ₹0.38 Cr.
- **Guarantees:** ₹265.60 Cr provided on behalf of subsidiaries, creating contingent risk on the parent balance sheet.
- **Capital/Strategic Commitments:** The withholding of the merger sanction by NCLT Chandigarh creates a significant strategic commitment risk and legal appeal costs.
- **Social Security Code:** Potential "material" impact on gratuity liability once rules are notified.

3.9 Earnings quality & forensic checks

#	Check	Impact	Status	Notes detail
1	PAT vs CFO trend	Profit ↓ — earnings overstate cash	—	Cash loss of □390.47 Cr reported confirms business is burning capital despite asset sales.
2	Receivables & channel-stuffing signal	Revenue ↓ — liquidation signal	—	Note 55: Cleanup involving write-off of □329.44 Cr in receivables suggests historical balance sheet bloating.
3	Revenue timing (unbilled/ advances)	Revenue ↑ — inorganic inflation	—	Note 56: Revenue quality impacted by including gains from sale of subsidiaries in operations.
4	Revenue from related parties %	Revenue ↑ — concentration risk	—	Note 56(i): Sale of Sector 106 land for □584 Cr to Elan Ltd signals strategy of monetization over development.
5	Inventory vs revenue growth	Revenue ↓ — inventory liquidation	—	Note 57: Loss of □189.36 Cr on sale of Juventus/Mabon indicates land parcels liquidated below carrying value.
6	Inventory valuation method change	Neutral — valuation risk	—	Note 4.9: Policy relies on subjective management estimation; Auditor KAM highlights risk in land valuations.
7	Exceptional items in operating profit	Profit ↓ — structural weakness	—	Note 55: Net write-off of □88.79 Cr from □368.23 Cr payables and □329.44 Cr receivables cleanup.
8	Depreciation rate vs useful life policy	Neutral — minimal impact	—	Fixed assets are a small portion of the balance sheet (□83 Cr) compared to inventory.
9	Provision reversals boosting PAT	Profit ↑ — non-cash boost	—	Note 55: Internal assessment led to massive cleanup of historical advances and trade balances.
10	Tax rate consistency	Profit ↓ — tax leakage	—	Note vii: Disputed tax dues of □86.37 Cr (Income/Service/ GST) pending in various litigations.
11	CWIP age and stalling projects	Neutral — asset stagnation	—	Strategy shift confirmed by Note 56(i) and 56(ii) regarding divestment of major land parcels.
12	Deferred tax asset recognition adequacy	Profit ↓ — valuation risk	—	Auditor KAM: Recoverability of □3,078 Cr investments and □3,321 Cr loans is "inherently subjective."
13	RPT quantum and trend	Neutral — value leakage	—	Note 48: □629.07 Cr receivable from London sale (FY21) remains uncollected after 24 months.
14	Dividend paid vs FCF adequacy	Neutral — liquidity preservation	—	Negative free cash flow and massive debt repayment (□1,352 Cr) preclude any dividend distributions.
15	Auditor KAM: Asset Recoverability	Profit ↓ — impairment risk	—	Auditor flagged recoverability as "inherently subjective," relying on projections that may not materialize.
16	Accounting Policy: Revenue Classification	Revenue ↑ — sustainability risk	—	Note 4.6 allows profit on sale of investments with underlying business to be recognized as "Other Operating Income."

4. Management & governance

A. Auditor report & key audit matters

- **Audit Opinion:** Unqualified.
- **KAM 1: Impairment Assessment of Investments and Loans:** The auditor flagged the recoverability of □3,078.20 Cr in investments and □3,321.91 Cr in loans to subsidiaries. The assessment is "inherently subjective," relying on property valuations and cash flow projections. Management justifies carrying values using government circle rates and certified projections.

- **Emphasis of Matter:** Note 52 highlights the critical withholding of the merger sanction by NCLT Chandigarh.
- **Going Concern:** Prepared on a going concern basis, though the NCLT merger refusal creates a strategic overhang.

B. Related party transactions

Party	Relationship	Nature	Amount (□ Cr)	Concern
Clivedale Overseas Limited	Erstwhile Promoter Entity	Outstanding Receivable (London Sale)	629.07 Cr	***Overdue >24 months; high recoverability risk***
Various Subsidiaries	Group Entities	Loans granted (Repayable on Demand)	3,372.46 Cr	***92.68% of total loans; granted at "nil interest"***
Subsidiaries	Group Entities	Guarantees provided	265.60 Cr	***Contingent risk on parent balance sheet***

- **% of Revenue:** 681.69% (Critical Flag).
- **RPT Verdict:** Governance Concern. The company exhibits extreme capital misallocation through nil-interest loans while the core business is loss-making. The failure to collect □629.07 Cr from an erstwhile promoter entity suggests potential tunneling or significant impairment.

C. Shareholding

- **Promoter Holding:** 0.00% (No identified promoter group as of June 2, 2022).
- **Public Holding:** 100.00%.
- **Pledged Shares:** 0.00%.

D. Board composition + KMP compensation

- **Board:** 6 Directors; 83.33% Independent; 1 Woman Director (Tarana Lalwani).
- **KMP Compensation:**
  - **Sachin Shah (WTD):** □0.00 from listed entity, but receives □3.60 Cr/year from a material subsidiary (Indiabulls Infraestate Ltd), masking true managerial costs.
  - **KMP Turnover:** High instability; CFO and Company Secretary both resigned in April/May 2023.
  - **Pay-Performance Disconnect:** Company Secretary received a 25% salary hike despite a □608 Cr Net Loss and 59% Sales decline.

F. Capital allocation & capex

Action	FY current (□Cr)	FY prior (□Cr)	Signal
Dividends	0.00	0.00	—
Capex	1.00	1.00	—
Equity Issuance	854.00	8.00	—
Net Debt Change	-636.00	-12.00	**Text**
Asset Sales	836.85	0.00	—
Impairments / Write-offs	38.79	0.00	***Text***

- **CAPEX Analytical Notes:**
  - CFO Coverage of Capex is N/M as **CFO is negative □343.00 Cr**.
  - Capex is maintenance-only (□1.00 Cr); no growth capex deployed.
  - **The □836.85 Cr asset divestment program is the only factor preventing a total liquidity collapse.**

H. Risks

- **Merger Refusal (Strategic):** NCLT withheld sanction for Embassy merger. **Impact: Stalls primary growth strategy and creates "going concern" uncertainty.** (Severity: High)
- **London Receivable (Liquidity):** □629.07 Cr due from erstwhile promoter entity. **Impact: Potential 20% hit to Net Worth if unrecoverable.** (Severity: High)
- **Asset Valuation (Financial):** Recoverability of □3,078.20 Cr in investments. **Impact: Massive potential write-downs if project cash flows lag.** (Severity: High)
- **Negative Cash Flow (Operational):** CFO at -□343.00 Cr. **Impact: Reliance on external funding/asset sales to meet interest.** (Severity: High)
- **Litigation (Regulatory):** □27.04 Cr in disputed Service Tax. **Impact: Direct cash outflow if CESTAT rules against company.** (Severity: Medium)

5. Scorecard & verdict

Part a: scorecard

Dimension	Rating (1–5)	Delta	Key evidence	One-line rationale
Business quality	2	↓	Sales -59%; 38% revenue from asset sales	Core development is stalled; business is surviving on liquidation of land bank.
Financial health	2	→	D/E 0.21x; CFO -□343 Cr; Int. Coverage -13.14x	Low leverage is a result of forced liquidation, not operational strength; cash burn is severe.
Earnings quality	1	↓	CFO < PAT; 329 Cr receivable write-off; London RPT aged >24m	Reported revenue is inflated by asset sales and historical balance sheet bloating is being "cleaned."
Management & governance	2	↓	92% loans to RPT at nil interest; High KMP turnover; London RPT risk	Significant capital diversion to related parties and leadership instability outweigh transparent disclosures.
Capital allocation & earnings visibility	1	↓	ROCE -7%; Merger stalled; GDV pipeline unproven	Value-destructive returns and total reliance on a legally-stalled merger for future visibility.

Business positives (for this company this year) * **Debt Reduction:** Successfully reduced **Total Borrowings** from □1,329 Cr to □693 Cr through asset monetization. * **Liquidity Generation:** Raised **□854 Cr** through QIP and □837 Cr through subsidiary divestments to stabilize the balance sheet. * **Management Transparency:** New leadership provided blunt disclosures regarding legacy "governance gaps" and "subdued" outlook. * **Asset Monetization:** Realized **□584 Cr** from the sale of Sector 106 Gurgaon land, providing a necessary cash cushion.

Business negatives / concerns (for this company this year) * **Core Operational Collapse: Revenue from Operations** fell 59% and EBITDA Margin crashed to -60.65%. * **Severe Cash Burn:** Reported a **CFO outflow of □343 Cr** and a total Cash Loss of □390.47 Cr. * **Related Party Leakage: □3,372.46 Cr** (92% of loans) tied up in related party loans at nil interest. * **Strategic Stagnation:** NCLT Chandigarh withheld sanction for the **Embassy merger**, the company's primary growth thesis. * **Asset Quality Risk: □629.07 Cr** London receivable is >24 months overdue; □329.44 Cr in other receivables already written off.

Overall scorecard summary Indiabulls Real Estate is currently in a state of managed liquidation rather than active development, with its financial survival entirely dependent on asset sales and equity dilution. While the balance sheet has been deleveraged, the core business is burning significant cash, and return metrics (ROCE -7%) are deeply value-destructive. Governance remains a high-risk area due to massive nil-interest related-party loans and uncollected promoter dues, placing the company on a deteriorating trajectory until the Embassy merger is legally resolved and core operations resume.

Part b: governance check matrix

#	Check	Status
1	Audit opinion clean?	—
2	Promoter pledge = 0?	—
3	KMP pay < 5% of PAT?	—
4	RPT quantum < 5% of revenue?	—
5	Board > 50% independent?	—
6	At least 1 woman director?	—
7	No statutory dues outstanding?	—
8	No fraud reported?	—
9	Audit trail enabled?	—
10	Frequent Auditor change	—

Final line: "Total: 7/10 — Governance Rating: 2"

Part c: investor verdict

Thesis: A distressed real estate holding company liquidating its land bank to survive while awaiting a legally-stalled merger to pivot its business model. **Overall stance:** Watch **Rationale:** The successful deleveraging provides a temporary floor, but the lack of core operational cash flow and the NCLT merger overhang make it a speculative bet on legal outcomes. **Re-evaluate when:** CFO turns positive or nclat grants merger sanction. **BULL CASE:** NCLAT approves Embassy merger, unlocking the □4,300 Cr GDV pipeline and "Embassy" brand premium. **BEAR CASE:** London receivable (□629 Cr) is written off and NCLAT upholds the merger rejection, leading to further asset fire-sales. **Key monitorable:** London Receivable Collection: □629.07 Cr → Watch for any further aging or write-down.